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Introduction 
In the wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007--2009, many proposals have been put forward for its 
causes and the appropriate remedies.  In response to an impatient and frustrated public, and 
several months before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission completed its analysis, Congress 
passed the 2,319-page landmark Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010, setting the stage for seismic shifts in the regulatory landscape of the financial industry. 
Clearly, change is afoot, but are we ready?  
In the context of such sweeping regulatory reform, one of the most urgent priorities is 
establishing the means to measure and monitor systemic risk on an ongoing basis. Even the most 
cautious policymaker would agree that attempting to eliminate all systemic risk is neither 
feasible nor desirable---risk is a necessary consequence of real economic growth. Moreover, 
individual financial institutions do not have the means or the motivation to address systemic risk 
themselves.  Because risk is closely tied to expected returns in this industry, as both theory and 
practice suggest, in competing for market share and revenues financial entities will typically take 
on as much risk as shareholders allow, without considering the consequences for the financial 
system as a whole. In much the same way that manufacturing companies did not consider their 
impact on the environment prior to pollution regulation, we cannot fault financial institutions for 
ignoring the systemic implications of their risk-taking in the absence of comprehensive risk 
regulation.  Unless we are able to measure systemic risk objectively, quantitatively, and 
regularly, it is impossible to determine the appropriate trade-off between such risk and its 
rewards and, from a policy perspective and social welfare objective, how best to contain it.  
 
However, the challenge is not just measuring systemic risk, but also implementing it within the 
existing regulatory infrastructure; at issue is institutional design as well as statistical inference. 






to mitigate the severity of an impending crisis. Achieving this lofty goal requires detailed 
knowledge of the dynamics of the financial sector. 
 
The technical side of risk measurement has received the most attention, particularly from 
academics, but risk management involves three distinct elements according to Lo (1999)---
prices, preferences, and probabilities---and we can frame the discussion of systemic risk in a 
similar fashion. Centuries of work by scientists and mathematicians have advanced the 
understanding of probability, but the practical difficulties in estimating the distribution of 
financial market data remain formidable. Estimating extreme events from everyday behavior can 
be seriously misleading.  The space shuttle booster O-rings performed acceptably in cool 
temperatures, but failed disastrously in the freezing conditions of the Challenger launch on 
January 28, 1986 (Tufte, 1990). Though not as rare as we once thought, financial crises remain 
extreme events. Making the problem even harder, figuring the odds means aiming at a moving 
target. The past twenty-five years of finance have stressed how changes in variance affect stock 
prices, interest rates, and spreads (Engle, 2010). Recent financial crises, from the sovereign 
defaults of the late 1990s to the Panic of 2007--2009 to the current problems in Europe highlight 
how quickly the correlations between different investments can change, encapsulated in the folk 
wisdom that ``in a crisis, all correlations go to one.'' 
 
Decisions also require a way to rank different risks--investors, even regulators, must confront 
their own (or society's) preferences, which are inevitably subjective--exactly how does a 
particular investor value different payoffs and probabilities? Still, as an aid to decision making, a 
variety of objective measures have been proposed, mainly variations of statistical concepts used 
to describe the ``risk.''  These include traditional measures such as mean and variance, along with 
the various flavors of the popular Value at Risk (VaR) measure such as expected shortfall.  Other 
notions such as stochastic dominance and its extensions, e.g., the economic risk measure of 
Aumann and Serrano (2008) or the operational measure of Foster and Hart (2009), provide a way 
to think about the trade-off between risk and return but must ultimately involve preferences. A 
more mathematical approach postulates a set of axioms that any ``good'' risk measure must obey. 
As might be expected, though, different axioms can produce very different risk measures, 
producing such varying measures as expected utility, coherent measures of risk, or uncertainty 
aversion. Regulators face the problem on a higher level, seeking to implement the trade-offs that 
society prefers. 
 
Finally, prices play a dual role in thinking about risk, as both the input and the output of the 
process. Price movements---the profits and the losses---drive the need for hedging and risk 
management. At the same time prices are the output, the outcome of supply and demand 3 
 
expressed through preferences and probabilities. But it is when prices do not properly capture the 
economic value of the corresponding commodity that problems arise.  As with air pollution, 
systemic risk arises when market prices do not reflect the full impact of a firm's decisions on the 
rest of the economy. This creates the need for something beyond business as usual. 
 
Perhaps in an ideal world, market discipline alone would induce firms to measure and manage 
risk properly.  But systemic risk, like other negative externalities, means that individual firms do 
not consider how their actions affect the system as a whole.  There is a sense in which we are not 
starting from the Garden of Eden.  Safety nets, such as deposit insurance or an implicit too-big-
to-fail policies reduce the incentive to manage risk. How supervision best responds is another 
matter.  Recently, the conversation has shifted from  the safety and soundness of individual 
banks, to the appropriate level of ``macroprudential'' supervision, that is, the total risk in the 
system.  An early proponent of macroprudential supervision, Claudio Borio of the Bank for 
International Settlements, explains it as having both a cross-sectional (distribution of risk) and a 
time series (change over time) dimension (Borio, 2003).  Other regulators have also voiced the 
intent to make regulation more macroprudential (Tarullo, 2010). One output of this philosophy is 
the Basel III proposal to require globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs) to hold 
additional capital buffers (BCBS 2011). 
 
Clearly, macroprudential regulators need valid measures of systemic risk. Operationally, they 
need these measures to set capital requirements and to consider other aspects of supervision such 
as merger decisions.  Measures that are not available on a timely basis, difficult to interpret, or 
easily manipulated are of little use.  But if risk measurement needs change, so to do regulators.  
This ``changing face of supervision''(FRBC 2010) is, in fact, becoming apparent in both the skill 
sets and organization of supervisors and regulators.  One example is the horizontal reviews 
conducted by the Federal Reserve System and the Financial Stability Board, which has 
introduced cross-functional, horizontal reviews for capital (SCAP, CCAR) and executive 
compensation.  These involve diverse groups of supervisors, economists, and lawyers, making a 
point of comparing results across similar firms.  
 
But reacting properly takes more than technical expertise. Will the regulators have the 
commitment to react as they should, forcing firms into resolution or requiring higher capital?  
How the public reacts to a crisis depends on how they expect the regulators to behave, and thus 
credibility and reputation become paramount.  The best systemic risk measures should support 
this, and enable the public to hold regulators accountable.  Ed Kane, among others, has called for 
the creation of a military-style academy for supervisors, as much to provide the esprit de corps 
needed to resist lobbying pressure as to provide advanced risk training (Kane, 2011). But this 4 
 
also suggests that there are limits to what supervision and regulation can accomplish, even based 
on advanced measures of systemic risk.  If so, the financial system should be designed to be 
robust to mistakes.  But if finding the correct statistical measure of systemic risk is hard, 
redesigning the financial system is orders of magnitude more difficult (Haubrich, 2001). 
 
Of course, any successful attempt to measure and supervise systemic risk must be based on 
understanding the financial markets, on how actual institutions behave and interact.  This is a tall 
order, as any list of  the major players would include banks, broker/dealers, hedge funds, 
exchanges, mutual funds, pensions plans, insurance companies and government sponsored 
enterprises. The financial crisis provided many examples of the byzantine connections between 
these players: consider the failure of AIG. AIG was writing credit protection, in the form of 
credit default swaps (CDS) on tranches of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) based on 
subprime mortgages (Stultz, 2010). Risk was transferred from home lenders via the derivatives 
market to an insurance company.  Uncovering such connections is  difficult even for highly 
regulated entities such as banks.  For example, a new, fairly priced swap arrangement has no 
effect on a company's balance sheet, as the two legs are priced to offset each other. Future price 
changes can shift the relative valuation of the legs, however, and so the swap does constitute risk 
to the balance sheet.  The crisis has renewed discussions of more extensive data collection, but 
such collection is expensive and, inevitably, a trade-off must be made.  In an ironic twist of fate, 
in 2006 the Federal Reserve stopped reporting the M3 monetary aggregate that contained a 
(limited) measure of repurchase aggreements (Repos, RPs), which, barely more than a year later, 
emerged at the center of the Financial Crisis of 2007--2009 (Gorton, 2010). 
 
The limits of accounting information have led some to look for connections via price 
information: Adrian and Brunnermeier propose conditional value at risk (CoVaR), Acharya, 
Pedersen, Philipon and Richardson (2010) use the marginal expected shortfall, and  Billio, 
Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2011) use principal component analysis and Granger-causality 
networks. This brings the discussion back full circle, in that advancements on the technical side 
of measuring risk can uncover structural connections. Even here, the analysis does not eliminate 
the need for wisdom. The connections are dynamic and changing---there was no correlation 
between monoline insurers and mortgage backed securities, until the monolines started writing 
insurance on mortgage-backeds.  The whole process might be compared to a card-counting 
blackjack player in Las Vegas trying to find patterns in a multi-deck sort.  A few hands don't 
reveal much about the remaining cards, but now start swapping in decks with extra face cards, 
and on top of that, every once in a while let a Tarot card from the Major Arcana turn up. 
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This is the current challenge that faces policymakers and regulators---even after the passage of 
the Dodd-Frank bill---and the focus of this NBER conference volume on quantifying systemic 
risk.  The chapters are based on papers presented at an NBER conference held in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts on November 6, 2009, and jointly sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland and the NBER.  We were fortunate to have a remarkable and diverse array of 
participants drawn from academia, industry, and government agencies, and the breadth and depth 
of ideas contained in this volume is a clear testament to their unique expertise. Each paper 
presented at the conference was assigned two discussants, one from academia and the other from 
either industry or government, and we have included summaries of these insightful discussants' 
remarks after each contribution. 
 
In ``Liquidity Risk, Cash Flow Constraints, and Systemic Feedbacks,'’ Sujit Kapadia, Matthias 
Drehmann, John Elliott, and Gabriel Sterne introduce a theme that reappeared in several other  
conference papers: while outside shocks may touch off a financial crisis, the reaction of market 
participants determines the course of the disaster. In the model they develop, solvency concerns 
at one bank lead to liquidity problems, as funding becomes more difficult.  This forces the bank 
to take defensive actions, hoarding liquidity and reducing lending to other banks. In certain 
cases, the problem snowballs (or becomes contagious) and a crisis looms.  As other banks find it 
harder to obtain liquidity, the problem can become systemic. The process illustrates, as do 
several other papers in this volume, how the fallacy of composition can hold in the financial 
markets: individual defenses against risk lead to greater risk overall.  
The paper emphasized the cash flow constraint: banks must have cash inflows that cover their 
cash outflows.  Kapadia  et al. go further, however, and quantitatively evaluate the systemic 
effects of this funding liquidity risk. To do so, the work builds on a broader project (RAMSI) 
underway at the Bank of England, using detailed balance sheet information from UK banks 
encompassing macrocredit risk, interest and non-interest income risk, network interactions, and 
feedback effects. Funding liquidity risk is introduced by allowing for rating downgrades and 
incorporating a simple framework in which concerns over solvency, funding profile and 
confidence trigger the outright closure of funding markets to particular institutions. The detailed 
look at the network of counterparty transactions demonstrates how defensive actions on the part 
of some banks can adversely affect others.  The model can accommodate both aggregate 
distributions and scenario analysis: large losses at some banks can be exacerbated by liability-
side feedbacks, leading to system-wide instability. 
 
In ``Endogenous and Systemic Risk,'' Jon Danielsson, Hyun Song Shin, and Jean-Pierre Zigrand 
explore the feedback between market volatility and traders' perception of risk.  Trading activity 
sets and moves prices, but traders also use the resulting price volatility to gauge risk. Equilibrium 6 
 
requires a consistency between the perceived and the actual risk.  In a setting where traders 
operate under Value-at-Risk constraints (although the logic carries over to risk-based capital 
requirements and more), volatility can become stochastic, even as fundamental risk remains 
constant. Trader reactions amplify fluctuations, creating a spiral of even greater response. If the 
purpose of financial regulation is to shield the financial system from collapse, then basing 
regulation on individually optimal risk management may not be enough: in this case, the prudent 
behavior of individuals increases the aggregate risk.  
Roughly speaking, a market shock, say a decrease in prices or an increase in volatility, now 
makes the asset look riskier according to risk management rules, be they Value at Risk or some 
other method.  This forces the firm to reduce risk by selling the asset.  But of course other firms, 
also noting the increased risk, do the same,  leading to an even larger drop in price, starting a 
downward spiral towards even more risk. A crisis can arise quickly, because the process is 
highly non-linear, with larger movements appearing suddenly.  The critical threshold depends on 
the specifics of each market: risk management strategies, leverage, and capital plans.  The paper 
applies this insight to a variety of markets, explaining the implied volatility skew for options,  the 
procyclical impact of Basel II bank capital requirements, and the optimal design for derivatives 
clearing and lenders of last resort. Spelling out the precise mechanism, though a challenge, takes 
a vital first step in the design of more robust institutions and policies. 
 
In ``Systemic Risks and the Macroeconomy" Gianni De Nicolo` and Marcella Lucchetta make a 
distinction between real and financial risk, and present a modeling framework that jointly 
forecasts both sorts of systemic risk. They emphasize that lost output and unemployment 
constitute the true costs of  financial crises. Thus, their systemic version of Value at Risk (VaR) 
has two components: the 5 percent tail of a systemic financial indicator (market adjusted return 
for the financial sector), and GDP at Risk, the 5 percent tail on real GDP growth. This 
framework is implemented using a large set of quarterly indicators of financial and real activity 
for the G-7 economies over the 1980Q1-2009Q3 period. They first use a dynamic factor model 
to check forecasting power, and then impose sign restrictions from a simple macromodel to  
identify the shocks. For example, an aggregate supply shock should increase output but decrease 
inflation.  
 
They obtain two main results. First, the model can, with some accuracy, forecast large declines 
in real activity, showing promise as an early warning system or a risk monitoring tool. Second, in 
all countries aggregate demand shocks drive the real cycle, and bank credit demand shocks drive  
the bank lending cycle. These results challenge the common wisdom that constraints in the 
aggregate supply of credit have been a key driver of the sharp downturn in real activity 
experienced by the G-7 economies in 2008Q4-2009Q1. 7 
 
 
In ``Hedge Fund Tail Risk" Tobias Adrian, Markus K. Brunnermeier, and Hoai-Luu Nguyen 
estimate the tail dependence between the major hedge fund styles, such as long/short equity and 
event driven funds.  They use quantile regressions to document how the return  of one strategy 
moves with the return on another.  Quantiles  can explicitly compare the dependencies between 
normal times (50 percentile) and stress periods (5 percentile). The tail sensitivities between 
hedge funds increase in times of crisis, some more than doubling. 
 
The paper identifies seven factors that explain this tail dependence; these risk factors include the 
overall market excess return, a measure of volatility, and the slope of the yield curve.   Because 
the seven factors are effectively tradeable in liquid markets, it is possible to hedge, or offload 
that risk, which significantly reduces tail dependence. The paper thus provides a built-in solution 
to the problem it uncovers. Implementing this solution may not be easy, however.  In fact, the 
paper demonstrates that individual hedge fund managers have no incentive to offload the tail 
risk, as funds that increase their exposure to the factors also increase their returns and their assets 
under management. Offloading the risk then lowers both sides of managers' expected 
compensation (the famous ``2 and 20'' rule). 
 
In ``A Tax on Systemic Risk,'' Viral V. Acharya, Lasse H. Pedersen, Thomas Philippon and 
Matthew Richardson take the important step of tying a specific regulation to a quantitative 
measure of systemic risk.  They explore the implications of taxing each firm based on its 
contribution to systemic risk. Specificaly, the tax would depend on a firm's expected loss 
conditional on the occurrence of a systemic crisis. Note the dual trigger: both the individual firm 
and the financial sector must become undercapitalized. The tax is then just the fair-value 
premium of insurance against this event. Although they derive the pricing for such insurance, 
they also examine letting the market set the price. Individual firms would be required to purchase 
contingent capital insurance, that is, insurance against the losses they incur during systemic 
crises. The cost of this insurance determines the firm's systemic risk tax. In a true systemic crisis, 
however, it is not clear that private firms would be in a position to provide the insurance.  Rather, 
joint private-public provision of such insurance (say 5%-95%) lets the government piggyback on 
the market's superior price-setting ability. The total insurance premium, or tax, should induce the 
financial sector to internalize the systemic risk. A further element of the design addresses the 
moral hazard problem: If the firm has insurance, why should it avoid the risk? In this paper, the 
payoff goes not to the firm, but to the regulator. This adds a measure of pre-commitment to the 
government rescue policy. 
 8 
 
Applying this measure of systemic risk to the recent crisis provides some encouraging results. 
The paper calculates both the tax and the insurance premium for major financial firms prior to 
the crisis, and  Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac show up high on 
the list, although AIG is prominently missing.  This suggests the intriguing possibility of an early 
warning system, but it is an entirely different question whether the tax would have been enough 
to reduce systemic risk in these firms---or the market---to a manageable level.  A further 
consideration is how this type of contingent support compares with other related proposals such 
as forced debt-for-equity conversions. 
 
In ``The Quantification of Systemic Risk and Stability: New Methods and Measures," Romney 
Duffey approaches the problem of predicting financial systemic risk from the standpoint of a 
general theory of technical systems with human involvement. Discussions about the financial 
crisis often borrow terminology from meteorology or other physical sciences: we hear about 
``hundred-year floods '' or ``perfect storms.'' The analogy can be misleading, not only because it 
neglects the rich analysis of risk quantification, minimization and management within the 
engineering profession, but also because it ignores the  human element. Among other problems, 
the meteorological terminology puts an undue emphasis on calendar time.  In human systems, 
failure instead depends on experience time. Airline crashes and automobile deaths, for example, 
depend on miles traveled.   Just what best captures the experience time for financial markets is 
unclear, but quite likely involves something like volume or the dollar value of transactions, and 
those have increased.  Between 1980 and 2009, monthly trading volume on the New York Stock 
Exchange increased by a factor of 100, from 1 billion shares to 100 billion. 
 
Accumulating experience has contrasting effects on the probability of major failures, sometimes 
known as the learning paradox. Learning reduces risk, but  learning requires  taking the risk  and 
experiencing the very events you seek to avoid.  As learning brings risk down to acceptable 
levels, there is more time for the unknown and rare events to manifest themselves. Indeed, risk 
often looks low before a major crisis, as the obvious problems have gotten resolved, but not 
enough (experience) time has passed for the new, rare problems to occur.  This interaction often 
makes it difficult for simple statistical models to capture the distribution of losses. 
 
A related theme was emphasized in the Keynote address by Henry Hu on ``Systemic Risk and 
Financial Innovation:  The Importance of the Underlying Process." Hu argues that a proper 
understanding of systemic risk requires understanding financial innovation as a process, 
focussing  less on particular products and more on how products are invented, introduced, and 
diffused through the marketplace. Any fixed classification or regulatory scheme quickly becomes 
obsolete, both because firms find ways around regulation and because the marketplace 9 
 
continually evolves.  Such rapid evolution makes mistakes inevitable, because learning takes 
time, and while that occurs, the heuristic approaches and cognitive biases of market participants 
have room to operate.  This human element again emphasizes the dangers of taking physical 
models of the market too literally: a market crash, the net result of many voluntary trades, is not 
a meteor strike, and indeed financial markets have an element of a self-fulfilling prophesy: if 
everyone trades according to a price rule, that rule really works, even if it is flawed. 
 
As an example of this evolution, Hu emphasized financial decoupling: the ability of firms to 
separate the economic and legal benefits, rights and obligations that standard debt and equity 
bundle together.  For example, a fund may buy stock and obtain voting rights in a corporation, 
but hedge the financial exposure with offsetting credit default swaps. Conversely, selling a CDS 
can allow economic exposure without voting rights, and more complicated examples abound.  
Reckoning with such possibilities clearly requires more than even the most sophisticated 
economic analysis, needing a unified, interdisciplinary approach drawing on both law and 
economics, each situated in the proper dynamic context. 
 
Some of the most important themes of the day arose not from the paper presentations but from 
the discussions, both from the assigned discussants and comments from the floor.  There were 
philosophical discussions about what it meant to understand: in biology, the question as to why 
polar bears are white has an answer from an adaptive/evolutionary standpoint (they blend in with 
the snow) or from a developmental standpoint (which genes create white fur). Others considered 
the differing roles of models used for description or for prediction.  Regulators from different 
jurisdictions considered the merits of systems that discouraged risk as opposed to early warning 
systems, and of deeply understanding one market versus testing across many markets. Others 
argued over the relative merits of different risk measures: value at risk, simple leverage, even 
instinctive feelings of discomfort among traders. 
 
However, there was widespread agreement that any serious effort at managing systemic risk 
must begin with measurement---one cannot manage what one does not measure.  In the very best 
tradition of the NBER, these discussions, and the analytical foundations that the following 
chapters have begun developing, represent an important first step in our attempt to better 
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